We use evidence from detailed records of FOMC deliberations to argue that the theory of the time inconsistency problem provides a reasonable explanation of the Federal Reserve's excessively expansionary policy stance during the 1970-1978 period when Arthur Burns chaired the Board of Governors. The records suggest that the Fed perceived a Phillips curve tradeoff and political pressures that made it difficult to adopt disinflationary policies at any moment in time; the tendency toward excessively expansionary policy was exacerbated by the short-run planning horizon the Committee faced in each of a sequence of meetings. We further argue that comparative static predictions of the time inconsistency model are consistent with both the rise of inflation during the Burns years and its subsequent fall.
Did Time Inconsistency Contribute to the Great Inflation? Evidence from the FOMC Transcripts
The time inconsistency problem is often invoked to explain an inflationary bias alleged to plague central banks. 1 The assumptions behind the reasoning are as follows.
First, the central bank is assumed to choose policy actions on a period-by-period basis in each of its meetings; it is not constrained by rules, but instead uses discretion in each period. Second, public expectations of inflation for the upcoming period are viewed as given at the time of the meeting. Third, the economy can be characterized by an expectational Phillips curve; i.e., if inflation is higher than the public expects, unemployment will temporarily fall below its natural rate. Fourth, the central bank values a marginal reduction of unemployment below its natural rate, but is also averse to higher inflation. Finally, it is assumed that expectations are rational.
With predetermined inflation expectations, the central bank sees an opportunity to lower unemployment via surprise money growth in each of its meetings. If expected inflation were zero, for example, the reduction in unemployment created by a money growth surprise would be "worth" the modest increase in inflation. However, a problem arises when public expectations are rational. The public, understanding the Fed's objectives, will correctly anticipate monetary stimulus, rendering the effort to reduce unemployment ineffective. Instead, the result is inflation. At the equilibrium level of inflation, the marginal gains from unemployment reduction are balanced by the added costs of additional inflation in the current period. This is suboptimal in comparison to a zero inflation outcome, but the latter is not an equilibrium in the absence of credible precommitment.
Alan Blinder (1997) , a former Governor of the Federal Reserve, has argued that the time inconsistency literature is largely irrelevant to present-day monetary policymaking. His argument is a simple one. If members of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) understand that attempts to drive unemployment below its natural rate will ultimately be unsuccessful, they will not attempt it. DeLong (1997, p. 265) says that he has "found no sign in Federal Reserve deliberations in the 1970s that timeinconsistency issues-either that future central bankers would not carry out the policies to which earlier central bankers had tried to commit them, or that the private sector would fail to believe long-run commitments to a low-inflation policy-played any role in policy formation." Similarly, Mayer (1999, p. 8) concludes, "All in all, it would be hard to write a reasonable history of Fed policy in which time inconsistency plays a major role." Persson and Tabellini (2000) , however, argue that these criticisms miss the point, since time inconsistency analysis does not predict that the Fed would want to generate policy surprises in equilibrium. Rather, in an inflationary equilibrium, the Fed's lack of credibility would cause a more restrictive policy to produce a recession. As a consequence, the Fed would refrain from pursuing a disinflationary policy. Some empirical evidence also supports the relevance of the time inconsistency theory of monetary policy. Ireland (1999) notes that the Barro-Gordon model predicts a positive association between the natural rate of unemployment and the equilibrium inflation rate; econometric results that build on this observation "can successfully explain inflation's initial rise and subsequent fall over the past four decades" (Ireland, 1999, p. 283) .
In this paper, we investigate the relevance of time inconsistency theory in an alternative way. Specifically, we adopt a narrative approach, using historical evidence from records of FOMC deliberations to evaluate the verbal arguments that policymakers used in support of their preferred policies. 2 The narrative approach has one great advantage: the reasoning and motivations of policymakers are likely to be best revealed by the arguments they originally used to support their positions. Our analysis focuses on the emergence of inflation during the 1970-1978 period when Arthur Burns chaired the Board of Governors.
Our discussion will proceed as follows. In section I, we sketch out the basic time inconsistency model of monetary policy and highlight the features of the analysis that we will subsequently document. In section II, we describe the FOMC documents from which we draw evidence to support our arguments. In section III, we consider the individual elements of the time inconsistency story. We first discuss external pressures on the FOMC to make the case that real economic activity was generally viewed as unsatisfactory. We then examine the Committee's views on the prevailing inflationunemployment tradeoff, the short-term nature of its policy actions, and the role of expectations in equilibrium. In section IV, we tie together the various threads of our analysis to construct an explanation of why inflation arose in the 1970s and not before.
We discuss alternative explanations of the 1970s inflation in section V and offer some concluding remarks in section VI.
I. The Basic Time Inconsistency Model of Monetary Policy
Following the approach of Barro and Gordon (1983) , assume that the economy is characterized by an expectations-augmented Phillips curve:
(1) 
In equation (3), n t ku represents a target value for unemployment. Because 1 k < , the target for unemployment is always below the prevailing natural rate. The parameter β indicates the degree of inflation aversion. (Rogoff, 1985) . Cukierman (2000) has shown that if there is uncertainty about the future state of the economy and if upward deviations of unemployment from the natural rate are penalized more heavily than downward deviations, then the inflation bias result holds even if the unemployment target coincides with the natural rate.
inflation rate is greater than zero. Under discretion, policymakers cannot credibly commit to a policy of zero inflation.
Equation (4) (Chappell, McGregor, and Vermilyea, forthcoming) . As we undertook that work, however, we simultaneously accumulated a file of items related to policy issues that have been widely discussed in the economics literature. As the file accumulated, we found that many of these items suggested to us that the time inconsistency problem played a role in the emergence and persistence of the inflation of the era. We then organized these items into the argument contained in the remainder of this paper.
The narrative approach does not permit us to rigorously test one hypothesis against possible alternatives, and it necessarily requires us to be selective in the arguments that we report. Nevertheless, we believe that the argument that follows provides a fair representation of the textual evidence upon which it is based.
III. The Case for Time Inconsistency
In this section, we draw on the Memoranda of Discussion and the Ford Library transcripts to document point-by-point key elements of the time inconsistency story of the 1970s inflation. We discuss (i) political and public preferences about economic performance, (ii) the short-and long-run Phillips curve tradeoffs, (iii) the period-byperiod nature of FOMC policymaking, and (iv) the role of expectations in equilibrium.
III.A. Political and Public Preferences About Economic Performance
It is clear from the textual record that the FOMC takes pride in its independence.
In our reading of the Memoranda and transcripts, we have not seen any comments that suggest that the Committee ever followed direct instructions from any outside authority.
However, the record also indicates that the preferences of external clients (the President, Congress, and the public) were noted and that the pressures they applied were felt.
During the 1970s, the message the Fed received consistently from these clients was that growth was too slow and unemployment too high.
In November Hayes that an unemployment rate of 5.75 percent, as projected for the second quarter of that year, was not sufficient to justify a decisive move toward ease, Governor Jeffrey
Bucher responded that it was also important to consider the tradeoff that Congress might consider appropriate:
Although many people now regarded a rate of unemployment in excess of 4 percent as acceptable, he was not convinced that Congress as a whole was prepared to accept a rate as high as 5 percent; certainly, it would not find a 6 percent rate acceptable. Committee members needed to be concerned about the effects that System policies might have on
Congressional actions to deal with high unemployment and to recognize that, in the long run, the adverse effects of such actions on prices could be much greater than those of any marginal measures the System might take at this point. [Memorandum of Discussion, February 20, 1974, p. 191] A year later, Boston Fed President Frank Morris argued that annual real growth as high as 5 percent was still inadequate as the economy moved into a recovery phase:
Mr. Morris observed that in his view acceptance of the staff projection led to the conclusion that the policy course being pursued by In sum, the FOMC's view during the Burns years was that output and unemployment had never reached politically acceptable levels. In terms of our model, while inflation was seen as undesirable ( 0 β > ), political pressures caused the Fed to value unemployment below its natural rate ( 1 k < ).
III.B. Phillips Curve Tradeoffs
The inflation-unemployment tradeoff was relatively stable during the 1950s and 1960s, leading some to believe that lower unemployment could be achieved, perhaps permanently, if society was willing to tolerate a moderately higher rate of inflation. By the late 1960s, however, the Friedman-Phelps natural rate hypothesis had questioned the likelihood of a permanent tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) argued that in the long run, any attempt to exploit the Phillips curve tradeoff would lead to higher inflation but no permanent reduction in unemployment (i.e., unemployment would tend toward its natural rate in the long run).
Their formulation underlies the Phillips curve of our model, provided by equation (1).
Although the record of FOMC deliberations does not show that members accepted the Friedman-Phelps vertical long-run Phillips curve, it is clear that they appreciated two of its key features. First, the tradeoff between output and inflation was more favorable in the short run than in the long run. Second, inflationary expectations had an important effect on the outcomes that were feasible at a moment in time.
On the first point, consider the comments of Morris in July 1976:
I'd like to go back to [the] comment I wanted to make earlier on the usefulness of these alternative monetary [policy] formulations … whenever you ask an economic model to give you the economic effects of the more expansionary policy over a fairly short period of time, you're up against the fact that the lags in the impact of monetary policy are much shorter on production than they are on prices, and I think every sheet of this kind that I have seen in the past eight years around this table suggested that a more expansionary policy would produce benefits in greater real growth and very little price effects, and I think that reflects the fact that the time horizon for this kind of exercise has got to be longer to be useful to the Committee. [FOMC Transcripts, July 20, 1976, Longer Run Targets, Tape 1, pp. 6-7] On the second point, the role of expectational inertia in sustaining an inflation was clearly recognized as a complicating factor when Committee members considered efforts to slow the rate of price advances. In December 1970, Kansas City Fed President George Clay stated that "the current inflationary episode had proceeded so far and had become so involved in the wage-cost structure that there was serious doubt that the inflation could be curbed by any feasible monetary-fiscal policy mix … Moreover, it had been and continued to be necessary for public economic policy to provide some stimulus to the economy" [Memorandum of Discussion, December 15, 1970 , p. 1125 . Gove rnor Charles Partee best stated the Committee's view, saying, "We certainly know that there's a built-in inflation rate of some considerable size resulting from the cost increases and the labor contracts [that] have been negotiated and will pay off regardless in this period to come" [FOMC Transcripts, February 28, 1978, Tape 4, p. 10, emphasis added] . Both of these comments not only illustrate recognition of the role of expectations in shifting the available Phillips curve tradeoff, but also make it clear that these expectations were essentially regarded as predetermined at the time of a meeting. It was common for Committee members to speak of the inflationary inertia as a cost-push phenomenon, emphasizing its exogeneity (as well as their lack of culpability) when advocating more stimulus.
Some Committee members explicitly adopted the view that the long-run Phillips curve might be vertical or nearly so. As early as May 1971, for example, St. Louis Fed President Darryl Francis noted that money growth and unemployment seemed to be unrelated over several extended episodes in the two previous decades: 6 In each case, Mr. Francis continued, the rate of growth in money was accelerated in order to overcome weakness in the economy. Despite those progressively more stimulative monetary actions, the rate of unemployment had averaged about the same whether the trend growth of money was 6 per cent, 3.5 per cent, or 1.5 per cent. The trend growth had had its chief impact on prices, whereas fluctuations around the trend had had the greatest impact on production and employment. [Memorandum of Discussion, May 11, 1971, p. 476] A month later, his comments again described the vertical long-run Phillips curve:
Mr. Francis said that such a slower growth in money would probably mean a less rapid recovery of production and employment, but one which was more likely to be sustained. Production and employment had risen at relatively rapid rates from 1962 to 1964 with a moderate 3.4 per cent average annual rate of growth of money. One might also observe that average unemployment since early 1967, when the growth rate of money had averaged more than 6 per cent, had been about the same as in the 1953-62 period when money had grown at an average 1.7 per cent rate.
Production and employment benefits gained by accelerating money upward from a previous trend had always been temporary. [Memorandum of Discussion, June 8, 1971, pp. 590-591] In sum, the FOMC recognized Phillips curve constraints much like those assumed by time inconsistency theory. In the short run, the costs (in terms of output and employment) of reducing inflation seemed high. In the long run, ingrained inflationary expectations permitted high inflation and high unemployment to coexist. Furthermore, from the Committee's perspective, expectations-induced cost increases appeared to be exogenous at any single policy meeting. Therefore, even though the equilibrium inflation rate was high, the policy actions of reasonable policymakers sustained it. In other words, the long run may be important, but it is not relevant to the subject of the Committee's decision to be made today. We've set ranges until we're blue in the face … we're just deluding ourselves if we think that we are really doing anything to correct the excessive growth of the money supply. [FOMC Transcripts, January 17, 1978, Tape 6, pp. 15-16] Correcting the excessive money growth might have risked a recession, though, and we have seen in the previous subsections that political pressures and public opinion during the 1970s weighed against taking such risks. Thus, FOMC members may have been obliged to pursue short-term objectives even when they appreciated the risk for longerrun consequences.
III.C. Period-by-Period Policymaking

III.D. Expectations and Equilibrium
The time inconsistency model is closed with an assumption of rational expectations. Although the Committee never seriously discussed the rational expectations hypothesis during the Burns era, it would be safe to assume that it was not a highly regarded notion. Despite this, it is useful as an assumption to make about equilibrium-in equilibrium, expectations about inflation and about policymaker actions should become correct. Furthermore, the strict rational expectations assumption is not essential for the key result regarding an inflationary bias. Although it is not widely appreciated, Nordhaus's (1975) article on political business cycles also included an analysis of inflation in a framework similar to that of Barro and Gordon (1983) , but with adaptive rather than rational expectations assumed.
8
FOMC members tended to view the public's expectations as largely inertial, but they also felt that financial markets often irrationally overreacted to perceived policy changes.
9 Because of this, the Committee was very sensitive to how its policy decisions might be interpreted. At times, they clearly hoped to influence how expectations would change as their policy actions were revealed.
8 In the Nordhaus model, adaptively formed inflation expectations converge to the equilibrium inflation rate in the long run and are in this sense "model-consistent."
9 This once led San Francisco Fed President John Balles to propose publishing moving averages of money growth over several weeks rather than the money growth figure for just the most recent week (apparently presuming that market observers would be unable to infer the latest observation from the change in the average). He said, "I would publish the moving average to try to get away from what happened yesterday.
Where the market reacted, in my opinion, in the wrong way to a single week's worth of figures. We've seen this repeated again and again and again and I am hoping that some day I can convince my colleagues around the table here to make some sort of device that we can publish ourselves so that the market would understand that there are a lot of random fluctuations in these weekly figures and indeed even the monthly figures." [FOMC Transcripts, July 20, 1976 While these comments may reflect a sincere desire to avoid "irrational overreactions," it is also apparent that the Committee realized that the benefits from monetary stimulus would be stronger if the stimulus could be implemented without aggravating inflation expectations. Such motives are consistent with those attributed to policymakers in time inconsistency theory, even if the rational expectations assumption ultimately renders them futile.
IV. The Time Inconsistency Explanation of Inflation
Thus far, we have argued that the Burns-era FOMC faced an environment that conforms to the theoretical setting for the time inconsistency problem and that the inflation of that era is compatible with its predicted equilibrium. Specifically, we have argued that FOMC documents indicate that policymakers desired unemployment lower than the natural rate, that they perceived an economy that could be characterized by an expectational Phillips curve, and that policy choices were made on a period-by-period basis without credible precommitment. Further, the FOMC believed that price expectations were essentially predetermined at the time of a policy meeting, but also knew that these expectations contributed to inflationary momentum over longer horizons.
These are key ingredients in the theory of the time inconsistency problem. We have also noted that members occasionally voiced frustration with their inability to escape what appeared to be a suboptimal inflationary outcome.
However, an obvious question arises: Why was inflation high in the Burns years compared to other periods? Mayer (1999, p. 8) argues that if the time inconsistency problem is to provide a convincing explanation for the Great Inflation, one must claim that the assumptions of the theory fit that time period more closely in the 1970s than at other times. 10 As in many economic models, predictions of time inconsistency theory are best expressed as comparative static results. The equilibrium inflation rate depends on the parameters of the model, and when those parameters change, the model predicts changes in inflation as well. Mayer's observation that inflation was higher in the Burns years than other times is not a refutation of the theory; rather, it requires us to ask if there is a comparative static interpretation of the emergence of inflation that is consistent with the predictions of the model. In this section, we argue that this is the case.
Recall equation (4), which provides the equilibrium inflation rate in our model:
According to (4), the economy's equilibrium inflation rate depends on the short-run Phillips curve tradeoff (parameter α ), the monetary authority's aversion to inflation versus output (parameter β ), the gap between target and natural rates of unemployment (determined by the parameter k), and the expected value of the natural rate of unemployment. In our view, it is plausible that changes in parameters and the natural rate of unemployment led to higher equilibrium inflation rates in the 1970s. Reserve-that the way to solve the problem of inflation was to apply 11 Nixon (1962, pp. 309-312) describes his view of the 1960 election.
direct controls rather than to slow the rate of economic growth and increase excess capacity. [Memorandum of Discussion, April 17-18, 1972, pp. 447-448] Burns and the FOMC recognized that raising interest rates when prices and wages were controlled might be politically dangerous:
So long as interest rates in general remained below the levels that had led him to take extraordinary actions that effectively imposed altered preferences on the Fed. These preference changes plausibly took the form of a lower value for k, which would imply a lower unemployment rate target, and a lower value for β , the relative 12 The difficulties Burns faced in his simultaneous roles as Fed Chairman and CID Chairman are discussed by Kettl (1986) and Wells (1994) .
concern for inflation versus output. Either of these shifts would lead to a prediction of higher equilibrium inflation.
While a politically induced change of preferences seems plausible in this case, using preference changes to explain varying outcomes is often a last resort for economists. Because preferences are not directly observed, explanations based on preference changes are difficult to refute, even when incorrect. We therefore turn to a second comparative static argument, this one based on supply shocks ( t ε ) that result in persistent shifts in the natural rate of unemployment.
Our premise is that the natural rate of unemployment rose in the 1970s.
Economists are largely in agreement with this assessment. For example, Gordon (1981) estimated that the natural rate of unemployment rose from 4.7 percent to 5.4 percent from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. 13 Evidence from Committee deliberations suggests that FOMC members recognized that such changes had occurred. For example, in July 1977, Chicago Fed President Robert Mayo observed, "Even the goal of 6 percent unemployment seems difficult to attain these days" [FOMC Transcripts, July 19, 1977, Tape B, p. 4] . Later in the same meeting, this issue came up again, along with a reference to what the politicians might find acceptable [FOMC Transcripts, July 19, 1977, Tape B, p. 9 
]:
Zeisel (staff): I think in terms of our reference toward unemployment, I
think one has to, as you know, recognize structural changes that have tended to occur in the labor market [that] tended to bias up the unemployment rate and in addition we've just been through a period of enormous growth in the labor force which was very largely made up of women who tend to have high frictional rates of unemployment. I think the 6-1/4 per cent rate, really, for comparison with past periods, has to be adjusted down somewhat.
Partee: You mean 6-1/4 might be a pretty good rate of unemployment.
Zeisel: Well 6-1/4 by capacity, yes.
Partee: Although I haven't heard anything here in the city that would suggest acceptance of tha t.
This exchange reveals that the FOMC had recognized an exogenous upward shift in the natural rate of unemployment, which, according to our model, leads to higher inflation. 14 The exchange also confirms our earlier suggestion that the gap between the natural rate and the politically determined target had widened. A wider gap (smaller k)
between natural and target rates of unemployment also leads to a comparative static prediction that equilibrium inflation should rise. Thus, the rise of inflation during the Burns era appears to be compatible with the comparative static implications of time inconsistency theory. Further, the subsequent fall of inflation in the 1980s could reflect a moderation of political preferences and a reversal of demographic trends affecting natural rates.
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14 Later in the same year, on September 20, the Committee talked at length about the full-employment unemployment rate. In particular, there was some discussion of a Wall Street Journal article by Herbert Stein, in which Stein had suggested that the full-employment unemployment rate might be as high as 7.0 percent. 15 The Volcker disinflation occurred after a change in administrations resulted from the election of Ronald Reagan, who, at least initially, appeared to be more inflation averse than his predecessors. In addition, estimates of the natural rate of unemployment show declines beginning in the early 1980s (Gordon, 1997) .
V. Alternative Explanations for the Great Inflation
We have argued that contemporaneous accounts of FOMC policy discussions support the view that time inconsistency theory provides a plausible explanation for the emergence of inflation in the Burns era. In this section, we will briefly discuss two competing explanations. The first of these emphasizes the importance of mistakes and misperceptions; the second emphasizes the role of exogenous shocks to food and energy prices.
Maye r (1999) notes that forecasting errors may have led to policy mistakes and subsequent inflation in the 1970s. He argues that the Burns-era FOMC consistently under-predicted the inflation rate and over-predicted the unemployment rate, leading it to advocate more expansionary policies than it otherwise would have. Similarly, Orphanides (2002, p. 7) finds that policy choices in the 1970s "were consistent with application of a 'modern' systematic, activist, forward-looking approach to policy." Those policies produced poor outcomes because of policymaker misperceptions, specifically misperceptions about the natural rate of unemployment. Given these findings, we cannot dismiss the possibility that policy mistakes played a role in the increase in inflation in the 1970s. However, we can offer two arguments against the "mistakes" hypothesis.
First, while forecasts and perceptions could not always be perfectly accurate, FOMC records also make it clear that the Committee realized that its actions risked exacerbating, or at least sustaining, inflation. Members viewed the tradeoffs that they confronted as unpalatable choices, but they frequently chose to favor short-run output concerns over longer-term inflation consequences. Second, if mistakes were made, their consequences were eventually revealed. If the rise of inflation was a consequence of mistakes, why were the mistakes not corrected more quickly when inflation was observed? The fact that the Committee persistently kept the federal funds rate low in the face of repeated money growth overshoots and high inflation rates suggests that the Committee could not bring itself to endure the consequences of producing lower inflation. Explanations relying on "mistakes" to explain such large and persistent accelerations of inflation are, at best, incomplete. Continuing, Mr. Leonard said the rationale for a highly stimulative policy rested in part on the large amount of unused resources available in the economy … He would suggest that the special factors-such as the poor crops and the energy shortages-that had reduced output in 1973-1974 also had reduced capacity … In his opinion the limits of economic capacity would be reached much sooner than the inflationists believed.
[Memorandum of Discussion, August 19, 1975, p. 925] Philadelphia Fed President David Eastburn further objected that it was difficult to distinguish exogenous and endogenous price changes:
Mr. Eastburn commented that he was concerned by the distinction that had been made between exogenous and endogenous price movements and, specifically by the notion that the increases in prices of foods and fuels were exogenous and had to be accommodated. He had difficulty in distinguishing between the effects of those increases and the increases in steel, aluminum, and autos, and he felt that an accommodative posture too easily could lead to acceptance of inflation. [Memorandum of Discussion, August 19, 1975, p. 933] Gramley responded that since other prices were downwardly rigid, accommodation of the food and energy price increases was necessary to maintain real growth:
Given the demand and supply conditions for [foods and energy], an adjustment in relative prices had to take place, and because of the downward inflexibility of most prices, it was just about impossible to get the adjustment in relative prices without a rise in the general level of prices. Thus, if policy did not accommodate the price increases for foods and ene rgy by permitting a higher rate of monetary expansion, the rate of growth in real GNP would be reduced. [Memorandum of Discussion, August 19, 1975, p. 933] Chairman Burns then reinforced Eastburn's point:
Price increases were always occurring because of factors that might be classified as exogenous, and if policy always accommodated such increases, it would be validating a never-ending inflationary trend.
[Memorandum of Discussion, August 19, 1975, p. 934] In this exchange, Burns and Eastburn clearly anticipated Bernanke's point that a supply shock requires monetary accommodation to produce inflation. Despite the antiinflationary rhetoric expressed during this meeting, Burns and the FOMC ultimately chose to leave the funds rate target unchanged, effectively adopting a policy of accommodation.
The preceding discussion suggests that supply shocks were relevant to the inflationary process, but in a way that is compatible with the theory of the time inconsistency problem. If the FOMC had consistently followed a Friedman-type kpercent money growth rule in the 1970s, inflation would not have accelerated as it did.
However, the time inconsistency theory implies that unfavorable shocks to natural rates will affect monetary policy and the equilibrium rate of inflation. When the equilibrium inflation rate rises, inflation expectations rise as well. Changing expectations are in turn reflected in wages and prices, and policymakers see what they perceive to be a "costpush" phenomenon. In the midst of this "cost-push" inflation, policymakers recognize that failure to accommodate will precipitate recession. As a result, they choose to "ratify" the higher equilibrium inflation rate, as they apparently did in August 1975. It is precisely this comparative static result that lies at the heart of both Ireland's (1999) econometric support for time inconsistency theory and our argument in section IV of this paper.
VI. Conclusions
As this paper is being written, inflation is low and Federal Reserve policymakers seem confident that the experience of the 1970s will not be repeated. However, if the theory of the time inconsistency problem provides a plausible explanation for the rise of inflation in the 1970s, it does not suggest that complacency is appropriate. Policymakers may ha ve greater appreciation for the importance of maintaining price stability, but the fundamental institutions by which monetary policy decisions are made have not changed, nor has the broader political environment. Shocks similar to those that emerged in the 1970s could do so again. While Blinder (1997) would comfort us with the argument that the time inconsistency problem is no longer relevant, a more troubling interpretation is possible. The current time-consistent equilibrium is more pleasant than the one prevailing in the 1970s, not just because the Fed is more enlightened, but also because of a fortunate confluence of exogenous economic and political forces.
